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In this paper, we discuss the new aspects of exchange rate policy which can be observed in the e-
merging market economies and their most likely implications for allocation, distribution and stabili-
zation goals. A special emphasis is put on the Chinese case, where large interventions in the foreign 
exchange market point at a significant undervaluation of the Renminbi. With many alternatives at 
choice, Chinese authorities still prefer to peg their currency, by and large, to the US-Dollar. On July 
21, 2005 a moderate revaluation and the introduction of a basket peg was announced, but a basket 
peg strategy is not yet visible in empirical figures. On the background of Germany’s experiences of 
1969, almost on the eve of the Bretton Woods’ system collapse, we model a speculative attack on 
an undervalued currency in the vein of the Flood-Garber seminal paper from 1984. The contents of 
the model are reflected against today’s reality in China, but also against Germany’s experiences in 
the past century. We come to the conclusion, quite in line with Germany’s experience of 1969, that 
the monetary authorities in China should anticipate such an attack and quickly proceed to a revalua-
tion of the Renminbi. We then propose a sequence of reforms/policies which should be imple-
mented in the aftermath.  
 
JEL Classification: E58, F31, O23  
Key words: Absorption Emerging markets economies, exchange rate policy, speculative attack, first 
generation models  
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 1  Introduction  1
1  INTRODUCTION 
There can be no doubt: emerging market economies have organized a complete turnaround in their 
exchange rate policies since say the beginning of the new millennium. After the experiences gained 
during the Mexican (1994), the Asian (1997), the Russian (1998), the Brazilian (1998/1999) and the 
Argentinean (2001) crises, they discovered a new strategy: Pay back your debt to international or-
ganizations such as the IMF (Argentina and Brazil have paid in full – and earlier than expected – 
their entire outstanding obligations to the IMF amounting to $ 15.46 billion and $ 9.6 billion, re-
spectively on December 2005), peg if you like your currency to a single currency or to a basket of 
currencies without committing yourself to a strict and passive rule as a currency board would com-
mand, accumulate foreign exchange reserves – be it to afford better a balance of payments crisis or 
be it to under valuate your own currency by systematic foreign exchange market interventions (buy 
foreign exchange/sell domestic currency). And something else is new: industrialized countries begin 
to worry about exchange rate policy of emerging market economies as they feel that these hamper 
their own export potential to these countries. There is now a second agenda for the access to the 
markets in emerging market economies beyond WTO.  
Good bye the times when emerging market economies did the opposite, i.e. when they over valued 
their own currencies, spent and depleted their foreign exchange reserves to satisfy the excess de-
mand on the foreign exchange market, committed themselves to the monetary authorities of a third 
country by currency board arrangements, became continuous and regular clients of the IMF incenti-
vating moral hazard behavior among domestic as well as foreign suppliers of credit. Industrialized 
countries in those days could be happy on the one hand with the implicit export promotion pro-
gramme embedded in the overvaluation of the emerging market economies’ currencies. On the 
other hand, they blamed emerging market economies for their risky management of foreign expo-
sure and their reluctance to complement (internal and external) financial liberalization with a sound 
surveillance of domestic financial markets. Speculative attacks on the old exchange rate regimes 
could throw countries or even regions into a severe economic crisis, triggered by the initial financial 
market crisis.  
Is that all over now? Most likely not, at least not in a broad meaning or sense. First: speculative 
attacks are not restricted to the case of countries with over valued currencies which sell foreign ex-
change to stabilize their exchange rates. Already the case of many countries which participated in 
the Bretton Woods system showed that there may well be speculation on the appreciation of a cur-
rency. Germany in 1969, can in fact serve as a good example for this phenomenon. Yet, the ques-
tion arises whether the blow of such an exchange rate regime can also trigger a financial market 
crisis. Second: Brian Pinto’s illuminating papers from the late 1980’s and early 1990’s receive a 
new relevance nowadays. His main point then was to look at the interaction between liberalization 
efforts in the foreign exchange market on the one hand and on the stabilization aspects arising from 
the budgetary consequences of such a liberalization on the other hand. As we intend to demonstrate 
in this paper, there is also a new liberalization/stabilization connection based on the modified ex-The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  2 
change rate policy in emerging market economies. There is an additional third aspect: major emerg-
ing market economies, with China figuring prominently, are nowadays in a totally different position 
with regard to the industrialized countries, especially to the US economy. Their exchange rate pol-
icy has meanwhile a significant impact on the size and the “allocation” of the deficit in the US bal-
ance of the current account. Something alike was the unthinkable during the 1970s. The 1980’s or 
even the 1990’s.  
2  THE CHOICE OF AN EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AFTER THE 
FINANCIAL TURMOIL IN THE 1990’S 
Since march 1973, the countries in the world economy are principally free to choose their exchange 
rate regime as the Bretton woods era was over. As the following Figure 1 demonstrates, this implies 
a rather broad portfolio of alternatives. At the beginning, it seems decisive to pursue either the left 
wing, the center or the right wing path. If a country favors an “intermediate regime”, it soon be-
comes obvious that the category of so-called “soft pegs” tends to destroy the a-priori seemingly 
great differences between “fixing”, “crawling” and “managing the float” of currencies. It is note-
worthy that emerging market economies, unlike developed countries, have, on an average, moved 
between 1990 and 2001 by 50 percent from intermediate regimes to other intermediate regimes and 
by 50 percent to floating regimes (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, p. 19). 
Figure 1  Exchange Rate Regimes 
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Sources: Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002); Heiduk (2005). 2  The Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime after the Financial Turmoil in the 1990’s  3
Empirical evidence shows that increased capital mobility „has pushed countries toward either 
greater fixity or flexibility of exchange rate regimes, and that the regimes between the two extremes 
will be hollowing out as countries abandon regimes in the middle ground” (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 
p. 28). This statement needs a qualification, however. “In particular, countries have tended to move 
to more flexible forms of intermediate regimes, away from less flexible ones, in part to minimize 
potential trade-offs between competing policy objectives in a world with growing mobility of capi-
tal” (Bubula and Ötker-Robe, p. 28).  
The above “catalogue” albeit complete as one would wish, does not fully explain the ex-ante rational 
choice situation of a government who aims at optimizing its exchange rate policy. In principle, the 
decision problem resembles the one in the “delegation model” of optimal monetary policy. The lat-
ter, in turn, can be exemplified by a two-stage game (Figure 2). And, as we will show below, the 
possible outcomes, do in fact symbolize the above systematized alternatives. In the first stage of the 
game the authorities have to decide between “fixing” and a “flexible” exchange rate regime. If main-
tained in the second stage, the country in concern makes use of a hard peg or of a conventional fixed 
peg in the above sense. If, alternatively, it decides to adjust the exchange rate in the second stage, the 
result is some sort of discretion, among them as candidates, crawling peg or a crawling band.  
Figure 2  Choices and strategies in a two-period decision problem 
 Choices 
            
Period t–1 fixing  devaluation 
                
Period t maintain   adjust  float    manage 
            
 devalue    revalue  depreciate  appreciate 
    
  optimal exchange rate (change)   
Source: own compilation. 
If the government continues with a float, the exchange rate may, depending on domestic and foreign 
circumstances depreciate or appreciate. The government may instead begin to manage the float with 
a view on a target exchange rate. In this case, however, monetary repercussions have to be taken 
into account. Such a regime may come quite close to some of the soft pegs mentioned in Figure 1.  
As two-stage games are usually solved backwards the task consists in first minimizing a more or 
less general macroeconomic loss function with respect to the exchange rate change. Once this opti-
mal exchange rate change is found, the second step should be to determine the optimal exchange 
rate regime for the first period. This regime would in principle fit best to the needs of an exchange 
rate adjustment. Let us make an example: Suppose the optimal exchange rate change is zero, then 
the task is easy, because an unconditional fixed exchange rate regime is the one which enables us 
best to maintain a constant exchange rate. This case is named “commitment” by Obstfeld (1997, 
p. 64).  The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  4 
Suppose alternatively, the optimal exchange rate change is a 10 percentage increase in the exchange 
rate. Here, the solution is less trivial. This result can be either achieved by a discretionary devalua-
tion, which implies the definition of a new target exchange rate (this case is called “discretionary 
escape clause” by Obstfeld (1997, p. 65)) or by a market induced depreciation. The latter in turn can 
be supported by an expansionary monetary impulse. Finally, when monetary policy is affected by 
too many impulse-reaction lags, direct interventions in the foreign exchange market may be neces-
sary to achieve the target exchange rate (change). Each of these choices is associated with distinct 
costs (or benefits):  
A discretionary devaluation goes along with psychological problems/personal costs of realignment 
for the government/policy makers who in the eyes of the public has/have abandoned an earlier “bas-
tion” of foreign economic policy and hence “lost face politically” (Obstfeld 1997, p. 68). An expan-
sionary monetary policy has all the deficiencies known best from the time inconsistency of optimal 
monetary policy plans literature. Interventions, or likewise exchange rate management, is (are) al-
ways confronted with the question of how sustainable these interventions can be.  
In a recent contribution, Alesina and Wagner (2006) have found empirical evidence for the follow-
ing hypotheses: “Countries that display fear of pegging, that is, do not keep to an announced peg, 
tend to be those with poor institutions. The reason is, we think, clear: Poor economic institutions are 
associated with poor economic management, and economic instability is incompatible with mone-
tary stability and exchange rate pegs. By contrast, we find that by and large countries with “good” 
institutions display fear of floating, that is, they float less than announced, or put it differently they 
try to peg and limit exchange rate fluctuations despite not having said so in advance. Our explana-
tion for this behavior is that these countries are afraid of wide exchange rate fluctuations (especially 
devaluations) which will be taken by market participants as an indicator of poor economic man-
agement. In other words, these countries peg more than announced to signal stability.” (Alesina and 
Wagner 2006, p. 797).  
How do these findings relate to the below chart? What Alesina and Wagner (2006) are able to ex-
plain is that a “fear of floating” may lead countries to announce a flexible exchange rate, but then 
move to a management of the exchange rate, as it is depicted in the right wing (period 2) of our 
chart. Also, they explain, why countries with poor political institutions are “less able to stick to their 
announcements of fixing, they end up floating more than what they announce and often break com-
mitments to pegging” (Alesina and Wagner 2006, p. 771). This issue is covered in part by the right 
wing (period 2) of the below chart. Thirdly, the rationality of fixing is also backed by Alesina’s and 
Wagner’s findings: “Because reneging on a commitment of fixing is associated with poor quality of 
institutions and of policies, more “virtuous” countries tend to avoid floating to raise their credibility 
and instead try to signal “rigor” (Alesina and Wagner 2006, p. 772). One may add, that in general, 
more foreign liabilities lead countries to prefer fixing (Alesina and Wagner 2006, p. 771).  
There is a final aspect in the findings of Alesina and Wagner (2006, p. 775), where our chart, from a 
first glance, does not fit in total: “If a ‘good’ country wants to signal its ability to keep a stable ex-3  The Effective Exchange Rate and Pegging to a Single Currency vs. to a Basket of Currencies  5
change rate, then why announce a float and then peg rather than simply announce a peg and stick to 
it? One answer is that announcing a float allows some room to maneuver. For instance, in relatively 
‘calm periods’ with no exchange rate crises, the fear of floating may be not to high, so this hypo-
thetical country may use a bit of the flexibility allowed by having announced a float. On the other 
hand, in turbulent periods it may be especially important to ‘signal’ and keep the exchange rate con-
stant – that is, the fear of floating is especially high.” In essence, this behavior can be interpreted as 
a temporary switch from a “float” to a “management” of the exchange rate (and backwards, if nec-
essary). 
If we look at actual exchange rate arrangements especially in East Asia, as this region was particu-
larly affected by the financial market crisis in Thailand of 1997, we can observe the following: As 
Genberg (2006. p. 4) puts it, “the current exchange rate arrangements in East Asia span the entire 
spectrum from a very hard peg in the case of Hong Kong’s currency board arrangement to the 
(managed, the author) floating exchange rate arrangement of the Japanese yen.” China introduced 
three important changes in its exchange rate regime on July 21, 2005: first to stabilize in the future 
its currency with reference to a basket of currencies, second a one-step revaluation of the Renminbi 
of 2.1% against the US-Dollar and third to allow the exchange rate to fluctuate within a ±0.3% 
band around a daily announced central parity (BIS 2006, p. 87). The Malaysian authorities moved 
to a basket peg in late summer of 1998. Singapore stabilizes an effective exchange rate as an inter-
mediate target to reach an inflation target (BIS 2006, p. 5). Finally, countries such as Indonesia, the 
Philippines, South Korea and Thailand do proclaim that they pursue an inflation targeting strategy, 
which at the end of the day seems to have implications for their behavior on the foreign exchange 
market. Some sort of “managed floating” seems to be in practice.  
Given the official statements we have refereed to which claim in several cases that basket peg-
ging/stabilization of an effective exchange rate is in operation, it seems worthwhile to analyze for a 
moment the implications of a single currency peg relative to a basket peg and then come back to the 
existing exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. 
3  THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE AND PEGGING TO A SINGLE 
CURRENCY VS. TO A BASKET OF CURRENCIES 
Given the fact that a number of emerging economies pretend to stabilize an effective exchange 
rate/to peg their own currency to a basket of currencies, we should briefly review the “mechanics” 
of the effective exchange rate (see Bender 1985). As stated in equation (3.1), the effective exchange 
rate is a weighted product of bilateral exchange rates of the currency of country A vis-à-vis to the 
currencies of other countries, the weights being usually derived from trade figures: 
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with eA=effective exchange rate, eiA= bilateral exchange rate between country i and country A, and The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  6 
wi=trade weight of trade partner i. For example 
EX
iA i A wE X E X =  are exports designated to coun-
try i as share of total exports of A, and 
IM
iA i A wI M I M =  are imports stemming from country i as 
share of total imports of A. 
Assumption: Country A has its main trade links with the USA and with the euro zone. Hence, we 
can simplify (3.1) to  
  () ()
( ) 1
€$ . AA A ee e
−α α
=⋅  (3.2) 
with α as trade weight of the euro zone and (1–α) of the USA, respectively. Given the bilateral 
exchange rate between the euro zone and the USA  
  €$€$ AA ee e =    (3.3) 
we get for the bilateral exchange rates e€A and e€A 
  € €$ $ AA ee e = ⋅  (3.4a) 
  $€ € $ . AA ee e =  (3.4b) 
Using (3.3), (3.4a) and (3.4b), (3.2) can be rewritten to  
  () ( ) ( ) ( )
(1 )
€$ $ $ $ €$ AA A A ee e e ee
α α− α α
=⋅⋅ = ⋅ (3.5a) 
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 (3.5b) 
Written as percentage changes gives: 
  $€ $ ˆˆ ˆ AA ee e = +α  (3.6a) 
  € €$ ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) . AA ee e = −− α  (3.6b) 
Now, with the help of equations (3.6a) and (3.6b), we can detect the consequences for the exchange 
rate of country A/the implied intervention rules the central bank of country A has to follow on the 
foreign exchange market. Let us evaluate the alternatives “pegging to a single currency” vs. “peg-
ging to a basket of (two) currencies.”  
3.1  Pegging to the US Dollar () $ ˆ 0 A e =  
Following such a strict rule can be accomplished, for example, by a currency board such as the one 
installed in Argentina in the 1990’s.  
From (3.6a), we achieve: 
  €$ ˆˆ . A ee = α  (3.7a) 
Rewriting (3.6b):  3  The Effective Exchange Rate and Pegging to a Single Currency vs. to a Basket of Currencies  7
  € €$ ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) . AA ee e = −− α  (3.7b) 
Equating (3.7a) with (3.7b): 
  ( ) €$€ $ € ˆˆ ˆ 1 A ee e α= − − α + (3.8) 
results in:  
  € €$ ˆˆ . A ee =  (3.9) 
Hence, both exchange rate changes on the left and on the right hand side of (3.9) can be observed 
ex-post empirically. If (3.9) strictly holds, an appreciation (depreciation) of the euro vis-à-vis to the 
US-Dollar leads to a corresponding appreciation (depreciation) of the euro vis-à-vis to the currency 
of country A. 
Suppose, we observe alternatively over time a small depreciation of the US-Dollar against the cur-
rency of country A, such as  $ ˆ 0, A e <  say the depreciation of the US-Dollar against the currency of A 
amounts only to a fraction of the depreciation of the US-Dollar vis-à-vis to the euro:  $€ $ ˆˆ ; A ee = −λ  
(0<λ≤1). 
Introducing this modification gives:  
  €$€ $ € $ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () A ee e e =− λ +α = α−λ  (3.10a) 
  ( ) € €$ ˆˆ ˆ 1 AA ee e =− − α (3.10b) 
  () ( ) €$€ $ € ˆˆ ˆ 1 A ee e α−λ =− −α +  (3.11) 
  ( ) €$ € ˆˆ 1. A ee −λ =  (3.12) 
In this case, the euro does not appreciate as much against the currency of country A as towards the 
US-Dollar. If pegging to the US-Dollar is some sort of exchange rate protection, as, at a flexible 
exchange regime, the US-Dollar would depreciate against the currency of country A to a more or 
less large degree, λ is some sort of a proxy for the liberalization of the exchange rate regime. If λ 
goes to one, European exporters to country A are not harmed by the depreciation of the US-Dollar 
on the world’s foreign exchange markets.  
3.2  Alternative: Pegging to a Basket (Euro, US-Dollar) of Currencies ( ˆ 0 A e = ) 
Again, recurring to equations (3.6a) and (3.6b), we now achieve:  
  $€ $ ˆˆ A ee = −α  (3.13a) 
  ( ) € €$ ˆˆ 1. A ee =− α  (3.13b) 
This rule would imply that in the case of an appreciation (depreciation) of the euro against the US-
Dollar, the domestic central bank has to intervene at the foreign exchange market. The central bank The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  8 
can choose between the options 
•  to provide for a (1–α)-times appreciation of the euro against the domestic currency (euro-
foreign exchange market), or  
•  to provide for a α-times depreciation of the US-Dollar against the domestic currency (US-
Dollar-foreign exchange market). 
Whenever the data for the period under inspection show significant exchange rate movements be-
tween the US-Dollar and the euro on the one hand, but little changes in the exchange rate between 
the domestic currency and the euro and/or the US-Dollar, the credibility of the officially announced 
basket pegging would be rather low. This holds on the condition that the weights (1–α) and α are 
of significant size, which implies the euro zone and the US economy to be important partners in 
international trade.  
China has claimed to have introduced some sort of a basket of currencies on July 2005 and to have 
switched away from the earlier peg to the US-Dollar. The basket, so it is said, consists of the US-
Dollar, the euro, the yen, and the Korean won. “In addition, the Singapore Dollar, the British pound, 
the Malaysian ringgit, the Australian dollar, the Russian ruble, the Thailand baht and the Canadian 
dollar are taken into consideration” (Siebert 2006, p. 16). How credible is this announcement? In 
fact, “the RMB/dollar rate was allowed to appreciate by 2.1 percent in July 2005, when the new 
exchange rate regime was announced, but has only been allowed to increase by the less than 1 per-
cent since that time” (Dorn 2006, p. 23).  
If a country argues that it has skipped a single currency peg in favor of a basket peg, there is, fol-
lowing Genberg (2006, p. 6), an easy way to detect the “truth”; for a country that stabilizes the ef-
fective exchange rate, “the ratio of US dollar volatility to effective rate volatility … would be very 
large.” But … “with the notable exception of Hong Kong, Mainland China, and Malaysia the vola-
tility ratio is far from zero” (Genberg 2006, p. 6).  
3.3  Repercussions of a ten percentage appreciation of the euro against the US-Dollar at 
different forms of exchange rate pegging by country A 
Finally, we can evaluate the consequences of the alternative forms of pegging presented above. In 
the first place, we make some simple assumptions on the nature and size of the weights used when 
calculating the effective exchange rate 
Table 1  Foreign trade structure of country A 
Foreign Trade Structure of Country A  Trade partner 
A’s-exports Share, 
EX
i w   A’s-Imports Share, 
IM
i w  
Euro zone  0.4  0.6 
USA 0.6  0.4 
Now we can compute the implied exchange rate changes: 4  The Allocative and Distributive Effects of Over- and Undervaluation  9
Table 2  Implied exchange rate changes 
Form of Pegging  Trade weights in the 
effective exchange rate 
€-Pegging 
(target: ê€A=0;  ê $€=–10%) 
$-Pegging 
(target: ê$A=0;  ê €$=+10%) 
Basket-Pegging 
(target: êA=0)  
Import weights  Result: êA=–4% Result:  êA=+ 6% Rule:  ê€A=+4%, ê $A=–6% 
Export weights  Result: êA=–6% Result:  êA=+ 4% Rule:  ê€A=+6%, ê $A=–4% 
4  THE ALLOCATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF OVER- AND 
UNDERVALUATION 
In the “old days”, emerging market economies tended to overvalue their currencies with the primary 
goal to ease the import of capital goods and, thereby to foster economic development. The impact of 
such a system on the allocation of goods and factors of production is to tax domestic exports (and 
capital imports from the rest of the world) and, hence to lower the domestic factor prices of those 
factors which are intensively used in the production of these goods, as can be depicted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3  The mechanics of an overvalued currency 
 
Sources: own compilation. 
From a development strategy point of view, it is not unreasonable for an emerging market economy 
to run current account deficits which lead to continuous net capital inflows. As capital is scarce, 
these flows are in line with the interests of foreign investors who aim at earning attractive real inter-
est rate incomes. A major objection against this view, however, is that this result would under 
“normal circumstances” come about by market forces alone, that is, one would expect that a real 
interest rate differential in favor of emerging market economies should prevail anyway and net capi-
tal inflows would command the current account to turn into a deficit.   The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  10
In the more recent past, we observe somehow the opposite strategy, at least among some of the ma-
jor players in East Asia, such as China: “The People’s Bank of China continues to peg the nominal 
exchange rate at a disequilibrium level, as indicated by the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves that now exceed $800 billion. To prevent inflation (and to maintain a quasi fixed rate, the 
author), the PBC sells securities to drain off the RMB that is created when the bank buys foreign 
currencies. That ‘sterilization’ process, however, becomes more difficult as the size of China’s cur-
rent account surplus grows” (Dorn 2006, p. 29).  
The impact of such a system on the allocation of goods and factors of production is to tax imports 
(and capital exports of domestic agents) – one may recall in this respect that the EU is nowadays 
complaining of China’s high import taxes on automobile components and may bring the issue to the 
WTO court – and, hence to lower the foreign income of those factors which are intensively used in 
the production of these goods, as can be depicted in Figure 4.  
Figure 4  The mechanics of an undervalued currency 
 
Sources: own compilation. 
As Dorn (2006, p. 31) puts it, “it makes no sense for a capital-poor country like China to run persis-
tent current-account surpluses that lead to net capital outflows – particularly, the massive accumula-
tion of foreign exchange reserves (these amounted to around 819 billion in December 2005, ac-
counting for 40 percent of GDP, Siebert (2006, p. 15) and, in the meantime exceed 950 billion my 
mid of 2006) used primarily to purchase U.S. government securities.” In the first place, because 
there should exist more attractive investment opportunities in the domestic economy than foreign 
government securities. Secondly, because it is more than counterintuitive seeing an emerging mar-
ket economy to export capital to the rest of the world. And thirdly, because this sort of strategic 
exchange rate policy is meant to boost one’s own exports to the detriment of competitors within the 
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Tong (2006, p. 239) found that “low-wage exporters of labor intensive consumer goods have reason 
to fear Chinese competition.” As Siebert (2006, 18) adds, “an undervaluation means higher ren-
minbi prices for agricultural products since these products are quoted in US dollar and China is a 
price taker (on the world markets, the author). This in turn implies a lower real income of industrial 
workers. Furthermore, the sector structure would be distorted in favor of the export industry” (see 
above). Not surprisingly, the US and other WTO member countries claim that in such a scenario, 
trade and exchange rate policy have to be considered jointly in order to assess the “true protection” 
effects (not to be confounded with the original contributions by Larry Sjaastad and David 
Greenaway (see for the references Sell 1988) to a “true protection” concept for trade policy alone, 
see Tokarick 2006) of both policies taken all together.  
5  THE STABILIZATION EFFECTS OF AN UNDERVALUED 
CURRENCY: IS THERE A CASE FOR SPECULATIVE ATTACKS?  
The literature dealing with speculative attacks on the currencies of emerging market economies is 
dominated by the classification of “first”, “second” and “third” generation models of financial mar-
ket crises (see Sell 2001 for an overview). Overvalued currencies figure prominently among the 
“stylized facts“ of these models and this is convincing since the financial market crises modeled in 
these approaches such as the EMS I crises of 1992/93, the Mexican crisis of 1994, the Asian crisis 
of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998 and the Brazilian crisis of 1998/99 went along with this phe-
nomenon. Can one really think of a speculative attack, let alone of an ensuing financial market cri-
sis, when the currencies in concern are under- instead of overvalued?  
Yes, one can, if we consider it legitimate to learn from history in general and from the days in 
which the Bretton Woods’ system was almost expiring in particular. Remember that since the late 
1960’s this system, many times advocated as “fixed peg”, more and more turned into a “soft peg” as 
a number of the famous “n–1” countries became more and more reluctant to import inflation from 
the US. As Hoffmann (1969) pointed out, in a world of weak or non existing capital controls, you 
cannot promise to the public at the same time a constant exchange rate and a stable price level 
whenever your partners in trade and capital flows experience (a higher) inflation (Hoffmann 1969, 
p. 3). This is in essence the content of the famous “Trilemma” in economic policy of open econo-
mies.  
The case of West Germany in 1969 can even serve as an example for a speculative attack on an 
undervalued currency. As is well known, West Germany at the time was governed by a first “grand 
coalition” between the christian democrats (CDU/CSU) and the social democrats (SPD). Almost at 
the end of the term, in spring of 1969, a heated debate separated the former legendary couple of 
“Plisch” and “Plum” (Wilhelm Busch), that is the minister of public finance, Franz Josef Strauss 
(CSU) and the minister of economic policy, Karl Schiller (SPD). Schiller was a strong proponent of 
a revaluation of the Deutschmark, while Strauss defended to maintain the central parity vis-à-vis to 
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Schiller’s argument, firmly supported by the council of economic advisors to the federal govern-
ment (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, SVR), basi-
cally put forward that Germany at the time was continuously “invaded” by massive short-term 
speculative capital inflows which forced the Deutsche Bundesbank (BUBA) to pursue a sterilization 
policy – if an import of inflation should be avoided – which was neither sustainable nor adequate 
for the medium-term German business cycle. In the short-run, according to Schiller, the overheated 
German economy would profit from a revaluation, as one could expect more imports and less ex-
ports.  
As opposed to this, Strauss denied the need for a revaluation of the Deutschmark. His point was that 
a revaluation should be avoided as it would harm German producers and exporters of agricultural 
products within the European Community. As the agricultural products within the EU were de-
nominated in so-called “green Dollar”, their equivalent in Deutschmark would fall in the case of a 
DM revaluation (Zimmermann 1969, p. 395). Also, he said that keeping a constant central parity 
would boost overall German exports and so stabilize the German business cycle on a medium-term 
perspective. Finally, according to him, such a policy would signal the US authorities constancy and 
good neighbor ship on the part of German economic policy.  
That time German chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU), making use of his “Richtlinienkompe-
tenz” and his one-vote majority in the council of German ministers, overruled the social democratic 
members of the government and refused to revalue the Deutschmark on May 9, 1969. Conse-
quently, the social democrats made this subject a key issue within their electoral campaign in Sep-
tember of 1969 and were apparently able to convince a small majority of Germans of the necessity 
to revalue the Deutschmark after general elections. Only a few days after Willy Brandt took over, 
on October 27, 1969, the Deutschmark was revalued by 9.3 (taking into account all accompanying 
measures) percent and speculation ceased. The new government, by the way, had allowed the 
Deutschmark to float freely, but only temporarily between September 30, and October 8, 1969 
(Köhler 1969, pp. 348, 350).  
According to Germany’s former central banker and then vice-president of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Otmar Emminger (later in the 1970’s, he should become president of the BUBA), three main 
objectives were pursued with this measure (Emminger 1970, pp.1-2):  
•  First, the reduction, if not abolishment of insecurity on the foreign exchange markets.  
•  Second, a reduction of Germany’s surpluses in the balance of the current account and, 
thereby, a better provision of goods for the domestic economy.  
•  Third, a dampening of excess demand on the domestic goods’ markets in conjunction with a 
stabilization of the inflationary upward pressure in domestic prices.  
As Emminger (1970, p. 2) reports, the revaluation of the Deutschmark had a fulminate effect on 
capital outflows: between October and December, 1969 the BUBA sold foreign exchange in the 
magnitude of 23 billion Deutschmark. This represented about 45 percent of Germany’s total official 5  The Stabilization Effects of an undervalued currency: Is there a case for speculative attacks?  13
foreign exchange reserves. These outflows more than matched the calculated 20 billion Deutsch-
mark capital inflows observed between February and September, 1969.  
Opposite to the effects observed during and after the “Asian Flu”, the BUBA experienced not only a 
significant loss of reserves after the revaluation of the Deutschmark, but also a negative wealth ef-
fect with regard to the remaining reserves: Before revaluation, one US-Dollar was 4.0 Deutschmark 
worth, after it was only 3.66 DM. Fritz Zimmermann (1969, p. 393) estimated the negative wealth 
effect related to the new valuation of the (remaining) foreign exchange reserves to be in the 
neighborhood of 4.3 billion Deutschmark. Formel-Kapitel 5 Abschnitt 1 
Edgar Salin (1971, pp. 199–200) observes that the BUBA could have avoided wealth losses by con-
verting their US-Dollar holdings into gold; however, at the time, the US authorities might have had 
difficulties to satisfy the corresponding gold demand. He also points at the necessity to do exchange 
rate realignments to the surprise of the public. In a way, he anticipates the Lucas critique and the 
policy inefficiency lemma, according to which only unexpected policy instruments can achieve real 
effects. In fact, an unexpected revaluation was no longer possible in the case of Germany given the 
for more than six months lasting discussion on the topic in academia and in the policy scene. Trans-
lating this topic into the Chinese case means that the government is still capable to surprise the pub-
lic as to the timing/dating of the revaluation of the Renminbi, and, of course, with regard to the size.  
The following model is in the tradition of the Flood-Garber approach to explaining speculative at-
tacks and follows closely the version put forward by Gärtner and Lutz (2004, pp. 334–41).  
  tt mp yi = +φ −λ  (5.1) 
  ( )
*
1 E tt ii e + =+    (5.2) 
 
*
tt epp = −  (5.3) 
 
Z Z
tt t M FB =+  (5.4) 
The first equation (5.1) represents a money market equilibrium, (5.2) stands for the uncovered in-
terest rate parity, (5.3) gives the relative version of purchasing power parity and (5.4) explains do-
mestic money supply as the sum of foreign reserves and domestic bonds in the portfolio of the cen-
tral bank. In addition, during the stabilization of the exchange rate phase, we have:  










= −μ  (5.6) 
Permanent foreign exchange market interventions induce a continuous sterilization policy; the latter 
implies the reduction of government bonds in the portfolio of the central bank by a constant rate −μ. 
Further assumptions are: All variables with small letters are natural logarithms except the interest 
rates. Domestic income, y, the foreign price level, p
* and interest rate, i
* are exogenous.   The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  14
Solving the model for the exchange rate leads to:  
  ( )
**
1 E. tt t em y i e p + =− φ + λ + λ −    (5.7) 
As long as there is a fixed exchange rate which is credible,  ( ) 1 E0 t e + =    and (5.7) reduces to  
 
** . t em y i p =− φ + λ − (5.8) 
As all other variables are exogenous, a fixed exchange rate is only compatible with a constant sup-
ply of money () : t mm =  
 
** . me y i p =+ φ − λ+  (5.9) 
As equation (5.4) shows, domestic money supply equals the foreign exchange reserves of the cen-
tral bank plus the amount of bonds held by the monetary authorities. For reasons of simplicity, we 
assume the money multiplier to be one. As the central bank continuously intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market, buying foreign exchange (selling domestic currency), sterilization ( 0) M =    im-
plies that the central bank has to reduce the stock of bonds held:  
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The central bank, hence, accumulates reserves, and, at the same time, reduces the outstanding credit 
extended to the domestic real sector. This process will necessarily come to an end, because a net 
domestic credit outstanding of zero is not a sustainable position for the monetary authorities, as do-
mestic interest rates will rocket to unprecedented levels. The question arises, however, as to when 
this point in time (T) will be reached. It can be characterized by 
 
Z
TT M F =  (5.13) 
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After the collapse of the old exchange rate regime, the authorities will start to remonetise the do-
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But ν is a function of time and diminishes quickly as time goes by:  
  ( )
j (T j), lim T j 0, j 1, n.
→∞ ν=ν + ν + = = …  (5.18) 
In complementing the seminal paper of Flood and Garber (1984), we assume that there exists in the 
foreign country an analogous money demand equilibrium:  
 
** ** . tt mp y i = +φ −λ  (5.19) 
Combining (5.19) with (5.1) and (5.3) gives:  
  ( ) ( )
** * . tt t emm y y i i =−− φ− + λ −  (5.20) 
Taking account of equation (5.2) modifies (5.20):  
  ( )
** () E . tt t t emm y y e =−− φ − + λ   (5.21) 
If both domestic and foreign income levels equal their equilibrium values, the exchange rate de-
pends on the different rates of monetary expansion and of exchange rate expectations. The actual 
exchange rate follows a downward trend as long as the foreign rate of monetary expansion exceeds 
the domestic rate and agents foresee a future appreciation: 













Equation (5.21) holds as long as the monetary authorities accumulate foreign reserves to maintain 
the exchange rate fixed and, at the same time, reduce the domestic credit outstanding. Once the lat-
ter approaches a zero level, or is pushed down actively to this level by speculators (T) who sell for-
eign exchange to the central bank, domestic monetary authorities, as we have argued above, will 
start to remonetise the economy.  
  ( ) ( )
**
Tj Tj Tj T1 emm y y E e , j 1 , n ++ + + =−− φ − + λ =   …  (5.23) 
with 
* lim 0 Tj Tj j mm ++ →∝ −=  and  () Tj j limE e 0. + →∝ =    
This means that the exchange rate will follow a “smoothing path” towards a new stable exchange 
rate between the domestic and the foreign economy. This process is accompanied by a continuous 
decrease of domestic interest rates towards the interest level in the foreign country. Domestic and 
foreign inflation rates will converge, provided the domestic central bank mimics the expansion of 
liquidity as it is organized by the foreign central bank.  The New Exchange Rate Policy in the Emerging Market Economies – with Special Emphasis on China  16
Which factors determine whether the speculative attack will occur sooner or later. Here, we follow 
closely Flood and Garber (1984) by calculating first the shadow exchange rate. What sort of ex-
change rate is this? As Gärtner and Lutz (2004) put it, this exchange rate would hold if there were 
no foreign exchange market interventions carried out by the monetary authorities:  




tt t eb y i e p + =− φ + λ + λ −     (5.24) 
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t eb ty i p =− μ − φ + λ − λ μ −    (5.25) 
A graphical interpretation of (5.25) would be represented by the following Figure 5.  
Figure 5   
 
Sources: own compilation. 
But this view seems to hold only up to the point A, or, likewise, if there was no speculative attack, 
up to point B and is, therefore, not totally correct. What is missing, is a careful inspection of what 








































  ()( ) 11 1 EE . TT T T em m m ++ + == − = μ−ν     (5.27) 
Hence: 




T ee b Tyi p = = −μ −φ +λ +λ μ−ν −  (5.28) 
A graphical interpretation of (5.28) is given by the alternative following Figure 6:  
Figure 6   
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If the attack occurs it will occur in point A or likewise in period T, for the same reasons given in the 
original contribution of Flood/Garber: If a speculator waits until the stock of domestic bonds in the 
possession of the central bank is “sold out” (at point B) , he comes late, as the central bank is no 
longer willing to buy foreign exchange. What, if a speculator attacks the central bank much earlier, 
say around the time where point C is reached? In this case, if the central bank would cease to inter-
vene, the exchange rate would jump into its value eC and hence devalue with respect to  . e  This 
would imply severe losses on the part of all investors who sold foreign exchange to the central bank 
previously.  
Alternatively, the exchange rate could appreciate until reaching point B where we also find no more 
domestic bonds in the portfolio of the central bank without having experienced a speculative attack. 
In both cases, the subsequent remonetisation of the economy is accompanied, because of (5.26), by 
a continuous depreciation (with growing rates) of the domestic currency. Most likely, the domestic 
authorities will decelerate the dynamics of buying bonds when reaching and surpassing the ex-
change rate level  . e  As a consequence, the exchange rate path becomes s-shaped. Notice that in the 
lower part of the graph, we have depicted the development of money supply and of the stock of 
bonds in the portfolio of the central bank. As shown above, the growth rate of money supply as 
measured by the angle α falls short of the growth rate of domestic bonds as measured by the angle 
β, at least in the short-run. In the medium to long-run, both rates will converge.  
  ( )
**
0 .
Z eb y i p
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Because of (5.9) – 
** me y i p =+ φ − λ+ – we can alternatively state:  








Following equations (5.29) and (5.30), the speculative attack will be implemented the later (T will 
be the higher),  
•  the lower the stabilized exchange rate; 
•  the lower the initial level of foreign exchange reserves; 
•  the higher the initial level of domestic bonds in the portfolio of the central bank; 
•  the lower domestic income which depresses domestic money demand 
•  the higher the foreign interest rate; 
•  the lower the foreign price level as this (by purchasing power parity) lowers domestic 
money supply; 
•  the lower ν. 
One should be careful, however, when sort of “applying” this model one to one to the actual situa-
tion of emerging economies, for example to the case of China. In the present, the People’s Bank of 6  Reflecting the theoretical considerations on Chinese reality and on Germany’s past  19
China is sterilizing incompletely the effects of its exchange rate policy; as a matter of fact, the base 
interest rate was increased on May 1, 2006 as the authorities are afraid of an overheating economy 
with money growth exceeding by far the presumed target values. The latter can serve as an indicator 
for incomplete sterilization. At the same time, raising core interest rates gives an additional incen-
tive to foreign speculators to deposit their money in China which puts pressure on the Renminbi 
upwards and strengthens the speculation on a revaluation of China’s currency. While it is true that 
there exist capital controls and a “management” of interest rates, additional capital inflows coupled 
with surpluses in the balance of trade make the intervention/sterilization job more and more difficult 
for the Chinese authorities. The example of Germany in 1969 is a warning memory.  
6  REFLECTING THE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON 
CHINESE REALITY AND ON GERMANY’S PAST 
Now with the intuition of the table and the two graphs in the annex, where we have plotted the 
Renminbi/US-Dollar exchange rate, the Renminbi/euro exchange rate and the US-Dollar/euro ex-
change rate, we can draw the following conclusions:  
•  Since early 2001, there is a clear depreciation trend of the US-Dollar against the Euro;  
•  this development is almost mirrored a hundred percent by the development of the Renminbi 
against the Euro;  
•  at the same time, there is a slight appreciation of the Renminbi against the US-Dollar;  
•  hence, it seems obvious that the Chinese authorities continue to peg their currency by and 
large against the US-Dollar;  
•  a sort of “cross check” is as follows: as the above tables would suggest, in the case of basket 
pegging and a significant appreciation trend of the Euro against the US-Dollar, the devel-
opment of the Renminbi against the Euro and the development of the Renminbi against the 
US-Dollar must have the opposite sign, no matter how different the size of depreciation or 
likewise appreciation is. The latter, in turn, depends on the weighting scheme chosen and on 
the weights itself.  
•  This result is robust, that is, it does not depend on the total number of currencies beyond the 
Euro and the US-Dollar considered in the virtual basket. As long as the trend between the 
Euro and the US-Dollar points upwards or downwards, the trends in the exchange rate 
changes between the Renminbi and the euro on the one hand and the Renminbi and the US-
Dollar on the other hand have to be opposite once a basket peg is installed.   
To maintain the exchange rate by and large fixed, Chinese monetary authorities have accumulated 
by the third quarter of 2006 more than 900 billion US-Dollars, and, as Goodfriend and Prasad men-
tion, “the spike in the pace of reserve accumulation during 2001–04 (and this holds for 2005 and 
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… the appreciation pressure has recently been driven as much by capital inflows as by current ac-
count surpluses” (Mohanty and Turner 2006, p. 41). In so far, a basic assumption underlying our 
model of a speculative attack against an undervalued currency, is backed by the facts of today’s 
China. As McKinnon and Schnabl (2006, p. 32) state, “the PCB makes a profit out of its foreign 
exchange operations. The PCB sells central bank Yuan-denominated bonds to the good burghers of 
Shanghai while buying much higher-yield bonds.” In fact, as the BIIS reports, in China the stock of 
outstanding central bank securities “rose rapidly to constitute 15 % … at the end of June 2006” 
(Mohanty and Turner 2006, p.47). Yet, their later conclusion, that the PCB can effectively control 
money growth is not convincing. The fact that foreign exchange market interventions are attractive 
for the PCB at present is a signal which stabilizes rather than destabilizes speculation in favor of the 
Renminbi.  
Yet, speculation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a successful speculative attack. 
Hence, a possible criticism against the model’s view may argue that according to the “open econ-
omy trilemma”, an exchange rate target can be defended if the domestic policy gives in either in the 
field of capital controls or in the field of monetary policy. What about the type of and the effective-
ness of China’s capital controls? Little can be found in the relevant literature on this subject. How-
ever, it seems to be that controls are more concerned with (and also more effective on) capital out-
flows than with (on) capital inflows. Capital controls together with domestic financial repression 
aim at maintaining the interest rate on PCB bills at low levels (Mohanty and Turner 2006, p. 36). 
“Altogether, it seems unlikely that capital controls can be counted upon to provide much scope for 
independent monetary policy in the presence of a tightly managed exchange rate” (Mohanty and 
Turner 2006, p. 35).  
An independent monetary policy could be confirmed or rebutted in principle on two grounds: either 
by finding (or not finding) ex-post that the monetary authorities despite the exchange rate target 
have achieved their goals in the field of price stability or when sterilization policy has been (or not 
has been) effective as measured by the envisaged (and achieved) growth rates for reserve money. 
According to Xie (2004), the monetary base is the operational target of the PBC. As the actual fig-
ures tend to show, China’s monetary policy has not been independent no matter which of these two 
yardsticks is applied. Indirectly, this result also points at the (rather low) effectiveness of Chinese 
capital controls.  
Under these circumstances, the rigidity of the Chinese exchange rate has severe consequences for 
China’s monetary policy. Horst Siebert (2006, p. 15) reports: “Since there is the need to sterilize 
monetary expansion, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) sells sterilization bonds (PBC bills) to the 
state-owned banks. From 2003 to 2004 the stock of sterilization papers increased by about 265 per-
cent, from 2004 to 2005 it increased by about 88 percent or by a value of US$ 117 billion – reach-
ing a value of 250 billion US$ for the overall stock of bonds … However, this vast increase covers 
only slightly more than half of the increase in reserves. Not all of the outside money can be steril-
ized; thus there is an increase in liquidity showing up in low inter-bank interest rates and the strong 7  Brief Summary and Outlook  21
increase in credits.” Siebert’s figure is not totally correct, because the sterilization coverage never 
exceeded a level of around 48 % (Goodfriend and Prasad 2006, p. 24).  
Sterilization is harmful to the allocation of resources for two reasons: when banks buy PBC bills 
instead of making loans, this crowds out bank lending. As a matter of fact, in China, “over 80% of 
central bank securities were held by banks at the end of 2005” (Mohanty and Turner 2006, p. 47). 
“If the non-bank public purchases PBC bills instead, then the public holds less bank deposits” 
(Goodfriend and Prasad 2006, p. 36). This, in turn, lowers financial intermediation. Financial re-
pression such as interest rate ceilings on deposits and loans (together with the emission of low inter-
est rate PCB bills, see above) help the Chinese monetary authorities to dampen the domestic interest 
rate level. The trade off between “liberalization gains” and “stabilization gains” demonstrated above 
with the implicit export tax serving as example will, however, apply here again. Once the authori-
ties begin to abolish financial repression, the impact of sterilization policies on domestic interest 
rates will work as presumed in our model.  
The experiences made by Germany in 1969 tend to demonstrate that the postponement of a neces-
sary revaluation goes along with severe macroeconomic imbalances: the inflationary pressures had 
become so strong in Germany that a dampening through the adjustment in the exchange rate and the 
concomitant effects on trade and capital flows were insufficient to restore stability. Contractionary 
domestic monetary and fiscal policy had to contribute to the goal of stabilization. Would such a 
scenario be welcome in an environment of continuous high economic growth in China?  
7  BRIEF SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
As the two graphs in the annex demonstrate, the Yuan/US-Dollar exchange rate has been rather 
stable in the immediate past. Since early 2002, the euro has recovered firmly against the US-Dollar. 
Hence, if the Chinese authorities would have stopped interventions at the foreign exchange market, 
the US-Dollar (euro) should have depreciated (appreciated) even more against the euro (US-Dollar). 
Does it mean that Chinese interventions have contributed to stabilize employment in Europe, given 
that the Euro would have won even more strength without Chinese interventions and European ex-
ports might have suffered? Who knows? 
Recently (on August 14, 2006), the PBS has fixed the announced central parity against the US-
Dollar at 7.98 Renminbi per US-Dollar. This constitutes an appreciation of about 1.6 percent within 
a month (say between mid of July, when the exchange rate stood at 8.11 Renminbi per US-Dollar, 
and mid of August, 2006). As the booming economy (with an expected yearly growth rate for 2006 
beyond 11 percent) cannot be stabilized with such small revaluations steps, the authorities supple-
mented their exchange rate policy by increasing the base rate to a level of 6.12 percent on August 
18 (in January 2006 it had a level of 5.60 percent). Yet, among the experts for the Chinese econ-
omy, nobody expects that these measures taken will suffice to stabilize the economy in general and 
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What about China’s options in the near future? As Goldwin puts it, “Meade (1951) emphasized over 
50 years ago, (that, the author) the classical remedy for an economy experiencing both domestic 
overheating and external surpluses is exchange rate appreciation, and neither reserve nor debt con-
siderations appear to constrain such exchange rate action” Goldstein (2004, p.12). If, on the oppo-
site, “China persists in sticking to an undervalued parity for the Renminbi and keeps accumulating 
reserves at recent rates, the real undervaluation of the Renminbi will ultimately be undone by a fur-
ther increase in China’s inflation rate” (Goldstein 2004, p. 33). Now as it stands, China is not yet in 
a position to quickly abolish financial repression, to lift up capital controls and to install “overnight” 
a flexible exchange rate. Sound suggestions from the profession of economists range from a “man-
aged float” to a “basket pegging”. Given the not so good experiences we have gained with (more or 
less discretionary) exchange rate management (some experts prefer the notion “manipulation”), a 
basket peg offers the advantage of combining a higher stability (rule character) with a sufficient 
flexibility (towards external shocks).  
Hence, China’s reform of its exchange rate regime could follow this sequence: First organize soon 
(to avoid Germany’s experience of spring 1969) a discretionary revaluation of the Renminbi of say 
10–15 percent. As a consequence, neither a loss of China’s external competitiveness nor substantial 
negative effects on FDI flows should be feared (Prasad et al. 2006, pp. 7–10). Second: If the au-
thorities observe a vanishing pressure on the foreign exchange market, then proceed to the install-
ment of a “real” basket peg. If not, let the Renminbi appreciate by market forces for a short while. 
As Prasad et al. (2006, p. 5) observe, the exchange rate can “still be allowed to fluctuate in response 
to the evolution of supply and demand of foreign exchange, even though there may be constraints 
on capital flows.” The basket should include China’s main trade partners, the US, the euro zone and 
Japan figuring prominently. In doing so, China, by and large, would then import the mean inflation 
of its trading partners. Third: Reform and stabilize domestic financial markets by the abolishment of 
domestic financial repression, the privatization of state banks, the set up of a sound supervision of 
domestic financial markets. Fourth: Only then a lifting of remaining capital controls and a full con-
vertibility of the capital account can be organized. Fifth: After the completion of steps one through 
four, China could move on to the definition of an explicit inflation goal as a nominal anchor and 
take the risk of a flexible exchange rate.  
We follow Prasad et al. (2006, p. 4) that “the experiences of numerous emerging market economies 
have shown the risks associated with maintaining a fixed exchange rate (in our case: a basket peg, 
the author) in tandem with a capital account that is open in either de jure or de facto terms, espe-
cially if there are weaknesses in the domestic financial system.” Though Chinese authorities may in 
fact control domestic residents and their demand for foreign assets, the same does not apply with 
regard to the demand of foreign agents for domestic assets, as it would totally contradict the “phi-
losophy” chosen with regard to private direct foreign investment since a couple of years.  
 Annex  23
ANNEX 











































































































































































































































Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, own calculation. 
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Classification of exchange rate regimes 
Source: Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002). 
Exchange Regimes with Another Currency as Legal Tender (Formal “Dollarization”) 
The country uses the currency of another country, which circulates as the sole legal tender. Dollari-
zation is a complete surrender of the authorities’ independent control over domestic monetary pol-
icy, and as such, can be viewed as the hardest form of a pegged regime. 
Exchange Regimes with No Separate Legal Tender (Currency Unions) 
The member belongs to a monetary or currency union in which they sham the same legal tender. By 
adopting such regimes the authorities also surrender control over domestic monetary policy and, 
hence, such regimes are also viewed as a hard exchange rate peg. 
Currency Board Arrangements (CBAs) 
An exchange rate regime based on an explicit legislative commitment to exchange domestic cur-
rency for a specified foreign currency at a fixed exchange rate, combined with restrictions on the 
issuing authority to ensure the fulfillment of its legal obligation. This implies that domestic currency 
remain fully backed by foreign assets, eliminating traditional central bank functions such as mone-
tary control and lender of last resort. While leaving little scope for discretionary monetary policy, 
some flexibility may he afforded depending on the strictness of the board’s rules.  
Conventional Fixed Peg Arrangements: Vis-à-vis a Single Currency or a Currency Composite 
The country (formally or de facto) pegs its currency at a fixed rate to another currency or a basket 
of currencies, where a basket is formed form the currencies of major trading or financial partners 
and weights reflect the geographical distribution of trade, services, or capital flow. The currency 
composites can also be standardized, such as that of the SDR. There is no commitment to keep the 
parity irrevocably. The exchange rate may fluctuate within a narrow margin of less than ±1 percent 
around a central rate or the maximum and minimum value of the exchange rate remains within nar-
row margin of 2 percent for at least three months. The authorities stand ready to keep the fixed par-
ity through direct (i.e., via sale/purchase of foreign exchange in the market) or indirect intervention 
(e.g., via aggressive use of interest rate policy, imposition of foreign exchange regulations or exer-
cise of moral suasion that constrain foreign exchange activity, or through intervention by other pub-
lic institutions). Flexibility of monetary policy, though limited, is greater than in hard pegs, as tradi-
tional central banking functions are still possible, and the authorities can adjust the level of the ex-
change rate, though relatively infrequently. 
Crawling Pegs: Forward and Backward Looking 
The currency is adjusted periodically vis-à-vis a single currency or a basket in small amounts at a 
fixed rate or in response lo changes in selective quantitative indicators (past inflation differentials 
with major trading partners, differentials between the targeted or projected inflation with major 
trading partners, differentials between official and parallel market rates, etc.). Distinction is made Annex  25
between backward- and forward-looking crawls: the crawl is viewed as “backward looking” when 
the crawl is set to generate inflation adjusted changes in the currency (i.e., when it aims to passively 
accommodate past inflation differentials under a real exchange rate rule); and as “forward looking” 
when the exchange rate is adjusted at a preannounced fixed rate and/or set below projected inflation 
differentials, typically when the exchange rate is envisaged to have an anchor role. Maintaining a 
credible crawling peg imposes similar constraints on monetary policy as a fixed peg system, par-
ticularly in a forward-looking crawl, as the authorities are expected to intervene to ensure the tar-
geted fixed depreciation path. The degree of intervention in a backward-looking crawl is expected 
to be less given the lack of commitment to a fixed depreciation path and the absence of a need to 
anchor expectations. 
Pegged Exchange Rates Within a Horizontal Band 
The currency is allowed to move within margins of fluctuation of at least ±1 percent around a for-
mal or a de facto fixed central rate. The authorities stand ready to defend the limits of the band 
through direct or indirect intervention to maintain the exchange rate within these limits. Some lim-
ited degree of monetary policy discretion can be afforded, with the degree of discretion depending 
on the band width. 
Pegged Exchange Rates Within Crawling Bands: Forward and Backward Looking 
The currency is maintained within fluctuation margins of at least ±1 percent around a formal or a de 
facto central rate, which is adjusted periodically in small amounts at a fixed rate, or in response to 
changes in selective quantitative indicators. A similar distinction is made between backward- and 
forward-looking crawls. The degree of exchange rate flexibility is a function of the band width; 
bands can be chosen to be either symmetric or fixed around a crawling parity or to widen gradually 
with an asymmetric choice of the crawl of upper and lower bands (in the latter case, there may not 
be a preannounced central rate). The commitment to maintain the exchange rate within the band 
continues to impose constraints on monetary policy, with the degree of policy independence a func-
tion of the bandwidth. 
Tightly or Other Managed Floating with No Predetermined Path for the Exchange Rate 
The authorities influence exchange rate movements through active intervention to counter the long-
term trend of the exchange rate, without specifying a predetermined exchange rate path, or without 
having a specific exchange rate target (“dirty floats”), Intervention may he direct or indirect. Indica-
tors for managing the rate are broadly judgmental (e.g., balance of payments position, international 
reserves, parallel market developments), and adjustments may not be automatic. Distinction is made 
between “tightly managed floating” (where intervention takes the form of very tight monitoring that 
generally results in a stable exchange rate without having a clear exchange rate path, so as to permit 
the authorities an extra degree of flexibility in deciding the tactics to achieve a desired path) and 
“the managed floating”(where the exchange rate is influenced in a more ad hoc fashion).   26
Independently Floating 
The exchange rate is market determined, any foreign exchange intervention aims at moderating the 
rate of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate that are not justified by eco-
nomic fundamentals, rather than at establishing a level for the exchange rate. In these regimes, 
monetary policy is in principle independent of exchange rate policy. 
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